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I BA.CKGROUND
Economic progress in south Korea (the Republic of Korea) was
unimpressive during the decade after the c188e of the Korean War (l953).
The annual rate of increase in real GNP averaged 4.6 percent. In the
spring of 1960, the Rhee government was overthrown by a student revolution.
\IRhee's successor, John H. Chang (Chang Hyon) was turned out by a military
coup in the spring of 1961. Political tutmoil, poor harvests in 1959-60
and again in 1962, and a poorly conceived currency reform in June 1962
combined to produce virtual economic stagnation toward the end of the
decade. Between 1959 and 1962, the average annual increase in real
output was only 3.4 percent.
The economic situation since 1962 or 1963 has been very different.
The military leadership, converted into a civilian government in 1963
under General (now President) Park, established the First Five-Year
Plan (1962-66) and instituted a stabilization program. This program has
been marked by conversion of government budget deficits to surpluses
beginning in 1963-64, major devaluation of the~ in June 1964, and an
interest-rate reform in September 1965 in which the basic loan rate
doubled and deposit rates more than doubled. Political stability, heavy
plan investment, better harvests, and the new stabi1itation policies all
affected the rate of economic growth. From 1963 to 1970, the annual
rate of increase in GNP averaged 10.9 percent (10.7 percent from 1962 to
1970). This was undoubtedly one of the highest national growth rates
achieved in the 1960s.1
Accelerated growth of this magnitude has produced major shifts in
economic structure. Korea's expansion in the 1960s was concentrated in the
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industrial sector which has been dominated, in turn,
by manufacturing. ~anufactures account for 82 percent of the 1965
value-added weights assigned to mining, manufacturing, and electric
generation in Korea's index of industrial production). The index of
manufacturing output doubled from 1960 to 1966, and more than doubled
from 1966 to 1970. This lncrease has been led by exports. The value
of merchandise exports doubled from 1963 to 1965, almost doubled from
1965 to 1967, and agaln from 1967 to 1969. Exports rose another 35
percent from 1969 to 1970, when they reached a total of 835 million dollars.
Less than a fifth of merchandise exports were manufactures in 1957-59, the
share of manufactures in this total was more than three-fifths by 1969.
Agricultural output has increased too, but at a lower rate (the annual
growth averaged 4.5 percent from 1960 to 1970). The share of GNP
originating in agrlculture (forestry and fisheries), in consequence, fell
from 40 percent in 1962-64 to 28 percent in 1968-70 while that of the
2
industrial sector rose from 25 to 39 percent.
Investment has taken an increasing share of gross national expen-
diture (the investment ratio rose from 10-12 percent in 1959-61 to over
30 percent in 1968-70), but there has also been a substantial increase
in real per capita consumption. There was practically no rise in
individuals' consumption from 1953 until 1963, but then consumption rose
from an average of 21.6 thousand~ to 34.3 thousand in 1970 (all value
figures shown here, unless otherwise indicated, are given in constant
1965 market prices or factor costs). This was equivalent to 59.1 thou-
sand ~ in current 1970 prices, or approximately $190 at prevailing
exchange rates. The increase in consumption has not been evenly
distributed, however, as the averages might imply. Real wages of urban
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workers' families rose 87 percent from 1963 to 1969; farm-family incomes,
in contrast, were no higher in 1968 than in 1963, and only 5 percent
higher in 1969. By 1969, current incomes of urban wage-earner families
equaled 333.6 thousand~ while the figure for farm households was
227.6 thousand. 3
Growing disparity between rural and urban incomes has undoubtedly
been a main cause of urbanization in recent years. Ministry of Agri-
culture and Forestry (MAF) estimates show that farm population grew less
4than 8 percent from 1960 to 1969, and actually began to drop after 1965.
Non-farm (urban) population, however, rose 54 percent so that by 1969 the
two populations were about equal. Much of the urbanization has been
concentrated in Seoul, which grew from 2.4 million to 5.5 million
inhabitants between 1960 and 1970. Total population rose from 21.5
million in 1955 to 29.2 million in 1966 and 31.5 million in 1970. This
represents a decline in the rate of population increase from an annual
average of 3.0 percent ln 1955-60 to 2.9 percent in 1960-66 and 1.9
percent in 1966-70.
II. ACTUA.L AND POTENTIAL lABOR SUPPLY
The Economic Planning Board (EPB) has conducted quarterly surveys of
persons aged 14 years and over based on the "labor-forcel! approach to
measur1ng economic activity (i.e. classification depends on actual status
during the survey week). The surveys employ a stratified, two-stage
sampling scheme in which the overall samples (1 in 1,000) are collected in
the mlddle weeks of March, June, September, and December. The EPB shows
coefficients of variation (ratios of standard error of the estimate to
the estimate) for different Size estimates. These indicate, for example,
..
,
- 4 -
that estimates of total employment (8.5 to 9.5 million in recent years)
lie within ± 225 thousand of the true value at the 95 percent probability
5level. Subtotals have proportionately wider confidence intervals.
Estimates of population aged 14 years and over, the economically
active and inactive, and employment with and without adjustment for hours
worked in 1963 and 1970 (or 1969) are shown in Table 1. The population
aged 14 and over increased 14 percent between 1963 and 1970 while the
economically-active population (those working one hour or more per week
or persons who "have an intention and are looking for work actively")
rose 16 percent and the number of people actually employed grew 20 percent.
If allowance is made for increasing length of the average work week (full-
time equivalent employment is shown in the last column of Table 1), the
rate of increase in actual labor inputs between 1963 and 1970 may well
have been double the rate of increase in potential supply.
The larger increase in actual than in potential supply suggests that
there was a considerable surplus d.laborm 1963. If there were "unlimited
supplies" of labor or substantial "disguised unemployment," insofar as
labor unemployed in a cewert fashion wa. readily available, then the
existence of such labor must certainly have facilitated Korea's rapid
6
economic growth during the 1960s. This hypothesis receives support from
the Second Five-Year Plan (1967-71), in which it was assumed that labor
supply would impose no constraints on growth. Early Third Plan (1972-76)
7documents suggest that this assumption may have been dropped.
Level and growth-rate data shown in Table 1 and the conclusions about
supply and demand drawn here from such data may well be misleading. The
annual figures are calculated as the simple average of four quarterly
surveys. The surveys mayor may not be representative of actual economic
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activity throughout the year. Quarterly estimates of numbers of economic-
ally active persons, the employed, and agricultural and non-agricultural
workers during 1966-70 are given in Figure 1. It is clear from this figure
that annual averages cover wide variation in seasonal activity, with the
number of economically active and employed some 3 million higher at June
peaks than during December troughs. The variation is concentrated in
agriculture, where seasonal swings of 3.5 to 4.0 million are partly
offset by a reverse pattern in non-agricultural employment. Farmers
evidently engage in some non-agricultural work during the off season.
Rice planting takes place in late April and early May, transplanting
in late May and early June. Barley and wheat are harvested in mid-June
and early July, while rice is harvested in October. Barley and wheat are
planted in late OCtober. The June survey may reflect the extra labor
needed to transplant rice, but the September survey misses the rice
harvest and the planting of wheat and barley. The March survey comes
too early to catch rice-planting activity. Whether the surveys are in
fact representative of overall activity during the year is not clear, but
as the relative importance of agriculture declines (see Figure 1), what-
ever error may result from the present scheduling of surveys is likely to
change. This change, in turn, is likely to bias trend estimates of the
economically active population and its components.8
A major point revealed in Figure I is the striking similarity of the
seasonal patterns for the economically active and the employed. The
residual, unemployment, is relatively small and shows much less (absolute)
variat1on--· 200 to 300 thousand -- than does the number of economically
active (2.5 • 3.0 million). When employment ceases, particularly in
agriculture, workers leave the labor force. They are not unemployed (e.g.
looking for work) because, presumably, there 1s no work for them. Would
those who are economically inactive during off-peak seasons be available
for work 1f work existed for them? The composition of the economically
•
>
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inactive population must be examined before this question can be answered.
The answer, if one exists, has important implications for labor supply,
the disguised-unemployment hypothesis, and the meaning of unemployment in
a country like Korea. If all persons emplo,yed in June 1969 were employed
throughout the year, for example, employment in 1969 would have averaged
10,733 thousand, not 9,347 thousand, the actual figure. If many of the
economically inactive in non-peak seasons would work were work available,
then the shift from economic activity to inactivity constitutes a major,
seasonal form of disguised unemployment. Also, if there is substantial
disguised unemployment, then open unemployment may be relatively
insignificant, or at least the distinction between the two types of
unemployment may lose its relevance.
The number of non-economically active rose from 6.4 million in June
to 9.3 million in December 1969 (see Table 2). Members of farm households
accounted for 90 percent of the increase. Of these, two-thirds were women
engaged in housekeeping, and half of the rest (17 percent) were men
similarly engaged. Housekeeping duties of many farm women evidently
permit them to help with harvesting barley and wheat and transplanting
rice in June. Whether such duties could also be abandoned in December
and other periods of seasonal slack is unlikely, but even if they could,
there remained a hard core of 6.4 million inactive at the seasonal
employment peak in June 1969. Of these, 1.1 million were aged and disabled,
almost 1.8 million were students, while 3.3 million were farm and non-
farm women engaged in housekeeping. Unless substantial numbers of non-farm
housewives can be enlisted in the labor force or students employed, slack
at the seasonal peak (263 thousand) is insignificant. If 1969 was
typical with respect to the economtcal1y inactive population, then the
,
..
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main single source of extra labor in December and other slack seasons
is probably the farm men who are engaged in housekeeping.
EmplOYment surveys provide little information on the sort of
disguised unemployment due to low or even zero marginal productivity, the
hallmark of the traditional or structural form of the disguised-unemploy-
ment hypothesis. Insofar as seasonal disappearance from the labor force
constitutes another form of disguised unemployment, however, then these
surveys show that there are between half a million (farmers engaged in
housekeeping) and 2.8 million "disguise~' unemployed at the seasonal
employment low in December, depending upon one's hypotheses about the
actual number of economically inactive who would work were work available.
Seasonal disappearance of potential labor is therefore at least as large
as open unemployment, which averaged 471 thousand in 1969, and possibly
much larger. If "unemploymentll is a term used to denote the situation
in which supply exceeds demand at some given price, then to the extent
that the economically inactive are available for work, the distinction
between overt and covert unemployment loses relevance. Published (open)
unemployment estimates, in consequence, are likely to be a poor proxy for
excess labor supp1y.9
Additional clues on potential labor supply can also be found in the
shifting composition of the non-economically active population from
1963 to 1969, shown in Table 2, and in the 1966 population census. The
number of economically inactive rose 10 percent from 1963 to 1969.
Housekeeping activity accounted for 60 percent of the total in both years
while the number of aged and disabled was constant at 1.1 million. There
was a large decrease in thp lI other" category, possibly because of more
accurate classification techniques as survey experience accumulated. The
•
•
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big increase came in those attending school, whose number grew by 574
thousand from 1963 to 1969.10 Single-year age estimates from the 1966
census show that the number of l4-year oids rose from 540 thousand in
1963 to 830 thousand 1n 1969. The number of potential (l4-year old)
labor-force entrants should increase to a peak of 969-970 thousand in
111974-75 before declining in subsequent years.
Expansion of upper level education has more than offset growth in the
numbers of those reaching working age. Continued diffuS10n of secondary
and higher-level education combined with a decreasing rate of population
growth is likely to produce a decline in the number of new labor-force
entrants, particularly after the mid-1970s. Also, the sort of labor
surplus that may have been concealed in the 1960s by seasonal disappear-
ance from the economically-active population should diminish with
reduction in the relative (and absolute) number of agricultural workers,
especially if employment continues to expand in other sectors as it has
in recent year••
III. OUTPUT AND EMPLOlMENT
Annual output and employment estimates during 1963-1970 for the
agricultural, industrial, and service sectors are shown in Table 3. The
output figures are GNP originating in each sector at constant (1965)
market prices, while the employment data are shown with and without
adjustment for average hours worked.12 The main sectoral shifts in these
years were the decline in agriculture's share in output (from 39 percent
in 1963 to 26 percent in 1970) and employment (from 63 percent in 1963
to 50 percent in 1970), largely offset by industry's rising shares (from
25 to 41 percent of outp~t, and fr~ 13 to 21 percent of employment).
•
•
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The service sector's output share increased 2 percentage points; service-
type employment rose 5 percentage points. Adjustment of the employment
data to a full-time (50-hour workweek) equivalent (PTE) is also shown in
Table 3.
The PTE estimates rise more (or drop less for agriculture) than the
unadjusted series because of a lengthening in the average workweek from
1963 to 1969.13 There was a discernible upward trend between 1963 and
1969 in the workweek for several of the major subsectors (manufacturing,
construction, services), but not in others (agriculture and forestry,
commerce). Yet the average for all sectors increased noticeably after
1966 (Table 4). The reason was continued decline in the relative (and
absolute) importance of the agricultural sector (see Table 3) and an
increase in the shares of other sectors. The average workweek in
agriculture and forestry has been 10 percent or more below the all-
sector average; working hours in the conmercial sector, for instance,
have been 20 percent or more above average. As agriculture's share in
total employment decreased, that of commerce rose from 10 to 13 percent.
Growth of the average workweek is likely to continue in the near
term as the balance of Korea's economic structure shifts more toward
non-agricultural activity. Present workweeks of 55-60 hours in most
industrial and service industries do not permit much increase in labor
input through longer hours in these sectors, however. In the long run,
given the backward-bending nature of the labor-supply function and the
secular dec line in average workweek observed in advanced industrial
countries such as the United States and United Kingdom, it would be
surprising if actual labor inputs (the PTE series) did not begin to lag
behind the increase in (unadjusted) employment.
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Over half of the additional (unadjusted) employment between 1963
and 1970 was in the industrial sector; two-thirds of the increment was
in manufacturing. The rest of the increase came in the service sector.
These increases were offset by a small decline in agricultural employment,
for a net gain of 1.6 million new jobs. Income (output) more than
doubled to 1.4 trillion ~, with over half of the growth originating
in the industrial sector. Again, manufacturing accounted for two-thirds
of the industrial increment. Two-thirds of the remainder was increase
in service income, the rest growth in agricultural product (see Table 5).
The ratio of employment (n) to income (y), nly, or the number of mall-
years per million~ of income (output) originating in each sector
during 1963 is also shown in Table 5. These ratios or labor coefficients
are the inverse of the usual productivity measure (net output per worker,
or yIn), and show labor intensity in each sector.14 Observed nly values
indicate that labor absorption associated with a unit of value added (net
output) in agriculture was three times that in the industrial sector
(and manufacturing), and almost two-and-a-half times that in the service
sector.
Ratios of incremental income, ~y. to increase in the number of
workers ( ~~), or bll ~n, are also given in Table 5. The negative
value of !J. yl ~ n for agriculture is a statistical artifact (is withdrawal
of labor responsible for an increase in output of 0.56 billion~ for
each man who leaves agriculture? Would continued withdrawal of labor
lead to continued output increaset), but the values of!J. yl !J.n for other
sectors are clearly very high relative to average levels of yIn (e.g.
yIn is simply the reciprocal of nly, or l/n/y) in 1963.) It is conceptually
wrong, of course, to attribute all of the increase in output to additional
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labor input because this ignores possible growth in productivity of the
eX1sting labor force; nevertheless, it is legitimate to ask what employ-
ment would have been in 1970 if labor intensity (n/y) had been the
same in 1970 as in 1963, or if productivity ( ~yl An) between 1963 and
1970 had remained at average 1963 levels. The difference between the
actual and hypothetical increase measures the reduction in potential
labor absorption due to productivity growth during 1963-70.
Employment would have risen by 6.1 rather than 1.6 million from 1963
to 1970 if productivity had not increased. lS Hypothetical increases
for each sector are shown in Table S. Greater proportionate differences
between actual and hypothetical increases in employment are seen in the
industrial than in the service sector, as one would suspect, because
marginal labor intensity (11 AYI An) is lower relative to 1963 levels
(n/y) or t alternately, because marginal productivity (A yl An) has
increased more relative to the 1963 average (l/n/y). Again, because
of the negative sign for fJ. n in agriculture, there is no valid way to
measure the relative impact of increasing productivity in reducing labor
absorption in that sector. Still, agriculture accounts for almost half
of the total difference between actual and hypothetical employment increase.
Annual (compound or geometric) growth rates for employment (Gn) and
income (G ), and the ratio of the two (G IG ) are also given in Table S.y n y
These growth rates show that manufacturing income has increased at almost
double the rate of service-sector income. Service-sector income, in
turn, has risen twice as fast as agricultural income. The same ranking
preva11s for employment growth, but levels and differences between growth
rates are smaller. The ratio G IG for each sector and the whole economy
n y
shows the increase in emplQyment associated with income growth, or the
•,
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amount of labor absorption per unlt of rise 1n income. This measure,
related to the product of labor lntensity (n/y) and the incremental
output associated with additlonal workers ( ~yl ~n), reveals that labor
absorption in the lndustrial and service sectors has been over twice
the national average, mainly because labor has been expelled from rather
than absorbed in agriculture. 16 The labor absorption rate of income growth
is low. Income has to grow at an average annual rate of 4 percent to
support a one percent increase in employment. This is not surprising in
view of experience elsewhere. 17 That the labor absorption rate for
services is not much higher than for industry (or manufacturing) is
18
unexpected, however.
Measures for labor intensity, marginal product, and the labor
absorption rate of income growth presented in Table 5 combine to show
that a large decline in the labor intensity of economic activity occurred
in Korea from 1963 to 1970. The decline was lntensified by a shift in
the composition of output from highly labor-intensive production in
agriculture to much less labor-intensive industrial output. Whether
labor lntensity in each sector would have declined as rapidly in the
absence of major structural change is unknown. Given such change and
declining labor intensity, however, the increase in employment was clearly
much less than it might have been had labor intensity been maintained at
1963 levels. Employment rose mainly because of the phenomenal increase
in industrial output.
The same measures for the components of the industrial and service
sectors can be derlved to determine whether labor intensity, marginal
product, or the labo~ ~bsorption rate of income growth vary much within
the larger aggregates (see Table 6). Labor intensity of construction is
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particularly high, that of public utilities specially low w1thin the
1ndustrial sector. Labor intensity is much lower for commerce than for
other services in the service sector. Marginal productivity (Ay/A n) was
generally lower than in manufacturing, but only in mining and quarrying
has the change in productivity been so limited as to maintain the 1963
level of labor intensity during 1963-70. Since mining output actually
dropped from 1967 to 1970, and rose I1ttle more than 10 percent from
1963 to 1970, low marginal productivity probably reflects failure to
modernize operations as demand for coal (60 percent of mining output in
1965) has declined. Both construction and public utilities, in
contrast, show major rises in productivity (output more than quadrupled
with no increase in public-utility employment) and, consequently, low
labor-absorption rates of income growth (Gn/Gy).
Reasons for changes in labor absorption might be examined at different
levels of generalization in which factors responsible for structural change
(more general) are distinguished from those associated with declining
labor intensity in each sector (less general) but unfortunately for
analytical purposes, the distinction is not always valid. A policy to
encourage exports by granting exporteD access to subsidized loans J for
1nstance, not only favors industrial growth but also substitution of
capital for labor in other sectors as well. Nevertheless, an attempt
is made in the next section to examine the determinants of labor absorption
with some respect for the difference between more and less general factors.
IV DETERMINANTS OF lABOR ABSORPTIOO
The nature of Korea's development under the Japanese, the effects of
partition at the end of World War II, and subsequent national plann~ng
strategy have a11 combined to Shlft the economic balance from agrlculture
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to industry in South Korea during recent years. Industria1izat~onunder the
Japanese had proceeded to the po~nt where over a third of net commod~ty
19product originated in mining and ~nufactur~ng by 1939-41. The most
rapid industrial development had occurred in the North, where the bulk of
heavy manufacturing (especially chendcals and metals) and electric
capac~ty was located. The South had accounted for most of the country's
text~le and machinery production and also contained three-quarters of
the area cultivated ~n rice and the Bummer grains. D1vis1on of an essentially
complementary economy into American and Soviet-dominated spheres in 1945
was reinforced by Korean War, which ended any chance for trade between
North and South and indefinitely postponed the prospect for reunification.
Much industrial growth in the South, such as the creation of a
chemical fertilizer 1ndustry and expansion of electric output, has been
determined by the need to replace capacity lost through partition.
But this does not expla1n the development of Dew industry nor why the South
(united Korea's "rice bowl") no longer exports r1ce when Korea had once
20been a major rice exporter before liberation from Japanese. In fact,
despite predictions that rice exports would reach half-a-million tons
by 1958-59, or that the Republic would achieve self-suff~ciency in
food product1on by 1956, the value of net food imports climbed from an
21
average of 27 ~1110n dollars yearly 1n 1960-62 to 209 million in 1968-70.
Korea 1S farther away than ever from achieving self-sufficiency in food
production.
Agricultural output has lagged behind demand for a number of reasons.
One is rapid population increase. Population in the Southern part of
Korea rose from 15.9 mll1ion in the spring of 1944, the last pre-diviSion
census, to 25.0 million by the end of 1960. Another is the fact that
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pre-war rice exports (termed "starvation exports" by Japanese food
officials) were offset by heavy imports of millet from Manchuria and by
22
other, low-grade grains. Perhaps the main reason, however, has been
the heavy emphasis on industrialization -- largely at the expense of
agriculture.
"The gist of the first five-year economic plan" (1962-66) was the
attempt to "build an industrial base ••• " Thoughmajor First-Plan
industrial projects (construction of an integrated steel mill, expansion
of machinery industries) were abandoned when the plan was revised downward
in 1964, the basic objective of the Second Plan (1967-71) was "to promote
23the modernization of the industrial structure••• " One consequence of
this objective has been that the proportion of total plan investment
allocated to the agricultural sector has been less than half the proportion
of GNP expected to originate in agriculture. Agriculture's actual
investment share was less than 40 percent of agriculture's GNP share in
1962-66, and less than a third in 1967-69. The industrial sector, in
contrast, accounted for two thirds of actual investment in 1962-66 (71
percent in 1967-69) but only 27 percent of output in the earlier period
and 36 percent in the latter.
Reasons for the planners 1 choice to emphasize industrialization
rather than agriculture have never been stated publicly. to the best
of my knowledge. Among such reasons might be Korea's l1mited supply of
arable land (only 20 percent of total land area) and high population
density (over 300 per square kilometer in 1968· above Japan but below
Taiwan). The II seed-fertilizer" revolution had yet to occur but large
quantities of surplus farm products (mainly wheat and cotton) were
available under the United Statss PL 480 program. Also Japan, Korea's
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traditional market, had adopted agricultural subsidies and tariffs to
keep out foreign rice. More generally, income-elasticity of demand for
primary products is usually thought to be low. Prospects for accelerating
the pace of development through the expansion of agricultural exports
were correspondingly poor. Further, rice cultivation was already highly
labor intensive and thus unlikely to provide much additional employment.
Perhaps the main positive factor favoring industrialization in Korea wa.
24the abundance of cheap, literate, and relatively well-educated labor.
Whatever the reasoning, industrialization had to be linked either to
import substitut10n or to export promotion. High aid levels following
the Korean War were expected to decline and other sources would be
25
needed to finance Korea's balance-of-payments deficits. Substantial
import substitution occurred as cement, newaprint, petroleum processing,
and rubber-t1re industries expanded. Domestic output in each case grew
from 25 percent or less of apparent consumption in the Ddd-1950s to 95-100
percent by 1965. More recently, the first plants of a petrochemical
complex were opened and an integrated steel mill is scheduled for the
mid-1970s. This new domestic capacity has helped to reduce sharply the
share of materials in manufactured imports (from two-thirds of the total
in 1956-58 to 37 percent in 1966-68). Imports of investment goods
(machinery and transport equipment) rose from 16 to 41 percent of the
total during this period.
Development of domestic machinery industries would seem to have been
a logical next step in import substitution, but this has yet to be taken.
The integrated steel mill, scheduled for the F1rst-Plan period, may not
be completed much before the end of the Third Plan. Construction of the
petrochemical complex is behind schedule. This is all evidence that
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import substitution has held second priority behind export promotion
(see Part I). There are a number of reasons why the potential for
261mport substitution is limdted, and these apply in Korea as elsewhere.
Perhaps the main reason that export expansion has taken precedence over
1mport substitution is that steel mills and petrochemical plants, like
cement and chemical-fertilizer establishments, are highly capital-
271ntensive operations And capital has been the scarce factor in Korea.
Structural change in which re8ource~ are shifted to indultry from
agriculture involves a shitt from a more labor-intensive composition of
output to a less labor-intensive one according to the estimates of labor
intensity (n/y values) shown in Table 5. This is logically separable
from changes in labor (capital) intensity of operations within each sector.
The decision to promote export expansion rather than push import substitution
has undoubtedly limited decline in overall nly and the potential fall in
labor absorption within the industrial sector. Comparison of capital-output
ratios for manufacturing industries in 1965 w1th ratios of export to
import values in 1960 and 1968 by Norton shows that the most rapid
export growth (in finished textiles, miscellaneous manufactures ~.g. wige7,
rubber products and plywood) has occurred, in fact, among the least
28
capital-intensive of Korea's manufactured products.
Though export-promotion policies have served to limit the decline in
labor intensity of output within manufacturing, a number of other policies
have had the opposite effect. Industrial inveltment is only one blade of
the scissors which has opened the gap between rural and urban incomes
(see Part I) The other is neglect of agricultural development. When
rural-urban wage differentials Widen, as 10Dg .s urban unemployment does
not rise appreciably, agriculture's absorptive capacity will fall as
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prospects for urban employment become more attractive relative to
agricultural work. 29 Also, anything which alters relative factor prices
by raising labor costs or lowering capital costs will encourage adOption
of more capital intensive techniques where factor substitution is possible.
In addition, policies that favor large-scale at the expense of small-
scale enterprise are likely to reduce labor absorption because 8mal1
firms generally employ more labor-intensive methods than large ones.
Evidence on whether agricultural development has been neglected
or not in Korea is mixed, but there are enough signs to indicate that
agricultural modernization has lagged and, in particular, that the course
of development has been such as to widen urban-rural income differentials.
On the other hand, the factor-substitution possibilities assoc1ated with
rice-dominated cultivat10n have resulted in factor reversals which, in
a country like Korea, permit use of labor-intensive techniques in what
would otherwise be an increasingly capital-intensive sector. The
characteristics of rice cultivation, in short, have tended to offset the
effects of backwardness on labor absorpt1on.
Average farm Slze in Korea, after a full-scale land reform in the
1940s and 1950s designed to eliminate ten&acy, was only 0.9 chongbo
(2.2 acres) by the early 1960s. The hallmarks of successful land reform,
according to Raup, have usually included expanded irrigation, a greater
supply of agricultural credit, increased factor inputs, and improved
30marketing arraagements. The proportion of 1rrigated paddy and the
consumpt1on of fert1lizer in Korea have increased markedly during the
past decade, but neither have reached levels attained in China (Taiwan)
or Japan. Organized credlt, both in meeting projected loan requirements
and as an intermediary for farmers' liquid savings, has been a conspicuous
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31failure. Some port~on of commercialized production passes through
government channels, mainly grains obtained from the grain-fertilizer
exchange program, as taxes in kind, or purchased outright. The rest is
marketed by private means, which are largely unknown. Perhaps the main
marketing problems have been uncertainty about prices at harvest time,
the traditional tying of credit to grain delivery (at usurious terms),
and the government's interest in holding down prices at the retail level.
Mechanization is in lts infancy, not because of small holding size or
historic difficulties of adapting machinery to standing-water cultivatlon,
but because low priority has been attached to expanding the supply of
machines 32
Though some of the hallmarks of successful reform are Ddssing or
fragmentary, Korean yields (per harvest) of rice, barley, and wheat in
the mid-l960s compared favorably with those obtained in China (Taiwan),
but were still significantly below Japanese levels. Korea ranked fairly
high in cross-country comparisons of production per hectare, but last in
33
output per worker Good yields seem to have been assoclated wlth
particularly labor-intensive cultivation
Evaluation of agrlcultural progress is compilcated by the large
number of explanatory factors and their interaction, but the last
fInding is of part1cular interest Gross yields per unit area in
Korea have been somewhat larger for small holdings than for large ones,
but the major variat10n by holding size is related to inputs. Smaller
units employ substantially more labor (and somewhat less irr1gation)
per unit area than large ones 34
Korea's small average holding size, rlce speclallzation, and relative
factor prices permit labor intenSIve agriculture of a sort which IS not
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necessarily found elsewhere. Ranking of lndustry by capital intensity
for Japan and the United States has shown a major difference between the
two in the relative capital intensity of agriculture, which casts doubt
on the usual "strong factor intensity" assumption implicit in the
35Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. Korea is certainly more like Japan than
the United States In this respect. There is, In other words, a possibility
of factor reversals, and rice is "the one agricultural product for
which there seems to be general agreement ••• that factor reversals do
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occur." It follows that displacement of agrIcultural labor in Korea
has been less than it might otherwise be, and that the need to absorb
labor In other sectors has therefore been les8 urgent than 1n some other
developing countrIes.
Beside plan emphasis on industrialization, perhaps the main factors
tending to reduce labor absorption have been government policies which
alter relative factor prices so as to reduce the cost of capital. Such
policies also tend to discriminate in favor of large scale, more capital-
intensive production Chief among these are the tariff structure and
exchange controls of commercial policy, maintenance of an overvalued
exchange rate, and government credit allocation.
Published tariff rates for Korea are high, though the actual level
has been more modest (8.4 percent in 1966) because over half of actual
37imports are duty free. Machinery and equipment are either exempt or
rates are low. Effective rates of protection (the net effect of tariffs
on inputs as well as outputs) have been highest for finished or semi-
finished manufactures, especially import-substitute or export goods, but
38quite low for food grains and machinery. The structure of duties and
"provisional special customs duties" has been quite elaborate: the main
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means of government control, however, have been registerat10n requirements
and regulations governing the use of foreign exchange.
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry issues import license to firms
which meet minimum export requirements ($200 thousand in 1970). Firms
..
which fail to meet the minLmum lose their licenses Foreign suppliers of
plant, equipment, and raw materials are guaranteed repayment in their
own currency by the Korea Exchange Bank. The government, because it is
ultimately responsible for repayment, screens loan applications. Large
enterprises, especially those with good export prospects, are usually
favored. Over a bi11ion dollars worth of commercial loans (mainly
suppliers' credits) were outstanding at the end of 1970.
Overvaluation of the~ has made imports more attractive relative
to domestic output, the high cost and limdted supply of domestic credit
have both encouraged foreign borrowing Sluce the last major devaluation
of the~ in May 1964, the~ rose from 257 to 319 !!m per dollar by
January 1971, or 24 percent. Wholesale prices increased 62 percent
durlng the period. Hlgh domestic intereBt rates since the interest-rate
reform in the fall of 1965 (bill rates have been 24-26 percent per annum)
and domestic credit ceilings, designed to ease the impact of large inflows
of forelgn funds on Korea's money supply, have both raised the cost and
llmited the availabilLty of domestic loans. It is hardly surprising
that local entrepreneurs have turned increasingly to overseas suppliers
of goods and credit.
The main organized sources of domestic funds have been the government-
controlled commercial banks and the Korea Development Bank (KDB) The
KOB's business is with large industrial enterprises, particularly
Ilgovernment-investedU firms such as the Korea Electric Company and Chungju
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Fertilizer which mainly supply basic materials or are public utilities.
This leaves the Medium Industry Bank (MIB) as the chief source of
funds specifically intended for small enterprises. HIB loans and
discounts at the end of 1970 were only 40 percent of KDB levels. A
little over one billion !2!!. in HIB acceptances (the local currency equival-
ent of KEB guarantees to foreign lenders) were outstanding at the
end of 1970 The KDB figure was 424 b111ion. 39
Tariff structure, import licensing, access to credit, and loan
subs1dy have all been used as instruments of export-promotion policies in
Korea There is nothing 1nherent in the nature of such policies which
should discriminate against small enterprise or favor machinery imports,
but in practice this has been the case. One result has been to lower the
cost of capital relative to labor (by granting access to undervalued
imports, financed by subsidized credit), with the incidental effect of
40
stultifying Korea's domestic machlnery industry. Another has been to
restrict access to imports and credit for ema11 enterprise. Both tend to
increase capital intensity of output and reduce labor absorption.
Whether measured 1.n terms of workers or value added, there was a
marked trend toward concentration in the manufacturing sector during the
1960s F1rm8 with less than 20 workers accounted for a quarter of value
added and a third of employment in 1958-59, but only 12 percent and 22
percent. respectively. in 1968. In fact. employment and value shares of
all size categories below 200 workers fell during the period (see Table 7).
The tendency toward concentration has undoubtedly been associated
with growth of demand, economies of scale, and increasing capital
intensity a8 relative factor prices shifted in favor of capital, but
it was also probably connected with the displacement of traditional
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goods and traditional, small-scale operations by modern products
produced by modern -- large scale -- means.
In 1958, for example, Korean style paper accounted for half the
employment and a sixth of value added in the manufacture of paper and
paper products. Two-thirds of establishments with less than 50 workers
were engaged in producing Korean style paper. A decade later, value
added ~n producing Korean style paper had quadrupled (in current prices)
and employment bas risen 10 percent. But fewer than half of the small
establishments were engaged in producing Rorean style paper, less than
3 percent of value added in the manufacture of paper and paper products
originated in Korean style paper making, and employment in the industry
had fallen below 20 percent of the total for all paper production.
(Value added per worker declined from one-third to less than a sixth of
the ~ndustry-group average). The Korean style paper industry is clearly
a dying industry, whose product is being displaced by the output of
larger, more capital-intensive establishments.
Value added per worker is one possible proxy for capital intensity
of output, but suffers from tbe fact that value added may vary with
indirect taxes (which are included in value added), efficiency of factor
uti11zat~on, or monopoly pricing as well as with changes in the amount
of capital employed per worker. Other possible measures of capital
intensity are value added per unit of fixed tangible assets, and the wage
bill as a proportion of production costs (all direct charges including
freight costs and payment for materials) or as a proportion of value
added Values of these four measures in 1968 for udning and manufacturing
establishments grouped according to establishment size are shown in
Table 8.
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Value added per worker and value added per unit value of fixed assets
vary directly with establishment size, while the wage bill as a prop-
ortion of production costs or value added moves inversely with establishment
size Such behavior is consistent with the thesis that capital intensity
increases with plant size. The different proxies for capital are erratic,
as has been noted before, Which indicates either that the relationship
between unit size and capital intensity is a weak one, or that intervening
41
variables are obscuring the true relation. The relationships shown
in Table 8 provide evidence, nevertheless, of a positive, possibly weak
relation between capital intensity and establishment size If this
interpretation of the eVidence is correct, policies which favor large
firms or discriminate against small ones also tend to limit labor
absorption.
Determinants of labor absorption in the goods-producing industries
(mining, manufacturing, and agriculture) can also be expected to affect
labor absorption in the construction, public-utility, and transport-
communications components of the industrial sector, and the service-
sector industries as well. Overvaluation of the~, for example,
should encourage the substitution of imported machinery for domestic
labor in a dry cleaning establishment just as in a plywood plant. There
are basic differences between labor-absorption characteristics of the
goods-producing and other industries, however. Some of these other
industries are either much more labor lnteusive (construction and
services) or less labor intensive (public utilities) than mining and
manufacturing (though not agriculture). Output in most cases Is not
exportable aod so these industriel have not benefited, except indirectly,
from the government's export-promotion policies. Also, government
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engagement is heavy in some instances, Which is not true of the loods-
producing industries. Economic incentives and, consequently, labor
42
absorption are likely to differ for government and private activities.
Construction output has grown more rapidly than that of most other
sectors in the Korean economy since 1963 (see Table 6). Ability of the
construction industry to keep pace with 1ndustrial expansion in the past
has prevented one of the major bottlenecks to growth found elsewhere.
Relatively low construction costs have also helped. Second~plan
capital coefficients were almost 20 percent below those found in the
United States because construction costs per unit of output in Korea
were less than three-fifths of u.s levels. The difference was due
43
mainly to lower labor costs.
Korea's comparative advantage in construction has probably
diminished in the last few years. One reason is that Korean firms
received large contracts for construction of facilities in Vietnam
following the escalation of the war there in 1965-66. As a result, the
domestic supply of construction workers - particularly the more skilled -
44has been constrained. Skill shortages combined with the initiation of
a national highway network, port expansion, construction of power
facilities, and other large-scale non-residential building have
undoubtedly led to substitution of capital for labor in construction,
the rapid productivity increases shown in Table 6 and, possibly, above-
45average wage increases.
Output of public utilities is dominated by electric generation. The
Korea Electric Company (KECO), • government-invested corporation,
produces most of Ko~ea's electric power and handles all power distribution.
KECO accounts for roughly 40 percent of public-utility employment, the
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remainder includes workers engaged in providing water, gas, and sanitary
services The public-utilities sector has been at the same time the
least labor intens1ve and the most rapidly growing of all sectors.
Underestimate of actual growth rates in both the First and Second
Plans created power shortages in the late 1960s as expansion of gen-
erating capacity lagged. Though electric generation more than doubled
between 1963 and 1967, and rose 87 percent from 1967 to 1970, total
public-utility employment actually fell 1n 1964 and was no higher in
461970 than in 1963. Demand for water and sanitary services, which are
supplied by local governments, should increase with urbanization.
Potential for employment expansion depends on government action and,
with the possible exception of sanitary services (which have been quite
labor intensive), is probably limited.
Employment has risen more rapidly 1n the transport, communications,
and storage sector than in any other sector. The Ministry of Commun-
ications and Korean National Railroad (KNR) accounted for 42 percent of
sector employment in 1963, but only 26 percent in 1969. This drop was
due to slow rise 1n KNR employment (14 percent), even though passenger
and freight traffic each expanded two-thirds or more over the period.
The same sort of large productivity increase in rail transport has been
47
observed elsewhere. Though pushed to the limits of capacity, the KNR
has failed to keep up wlth lncreasing demand. The KNR's share in total
transport has declloed as road haulage increased, aided by new road
construction (mileage of pBved road rose 50 percent from 1966 to 1969)
and the rapid increase in numbers of trucks and buses (each more than
doubled from 1966 to \969). The switch from rail to road transport,
which is inherently more labor intensive, has probably been a main
reason for t~e sector'e high labor-absorption rate of income growth.
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Communications demand has also expanded rapidly. The volume of mail
rose ~o-and-a-half times fram 1966 to 1969; the number of local telephone
calls quadrupled. A World Bank mi.sion observed in 1966 that "trans-
portation in Korea is characterized by a general undercapacity of all
48
modes of transportation. 1I The same caD be said of communications.
especially telephone service. As in the case of utilities, output growth
has failed to keep up with demand. Unlike utilities. however, prevailing
communications technology is considerably less capital-intensive than
existing technology in use elsewhere. Future expansion will undoubtedly
be characterized by replacement of cro.aing guards with electric signals,
substitution of automatic switchboards for operators, increased use of
materials-handling equipment, etc.
The service-sector category groups commerce (low labor intensity,
high marginal productivity) with services (high labor intensity, low
marginal productivity). Wholesale and reta11 trade generated about 90
percent of Lncame originating in commerce in the 1960s. the rest was
derived from banking, 1nsurance, and real estate. A census of retail
and wholesale trade in July 1968, excluding those establishments with
"removable or temporary business space and installations" (i.e. street
vendors and many market sellers), listed 555 thousand employees of 278
49thousand establishments. The EPB employment survey for June showed
1,135 thousand persons employed in commerce. A large portion of the
difference was probably composed of itinerant vendors.
Fewer than 10 percent of wholesale establishments shown in the
census had 10 or more employees. the figure for retail establishments
was 1e88 than 1 percent. Since annual .a1e. per employee or per unit
area of floor space rose sharply with establishment slze, larger units
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appear to be more e££1cient than small ones. A recent government project
to group selected retail food and appliance stores in Seoul into a chain
50
system may foreshadow the future course of commercial development. I£
so, continued productivity increase and declining labor-absorption rates
of income growth can be expected.
The service-industry part of the service sector, which includes
government, community, business, amusement, and personal services, is
probably the least homogeneous of the employment categories in terms of
scale, capital lntensity, and mixture of traditional and modern activity.
It is certainly the most heterogeneous in terms of skill, occupational,
and wage differentials. nata are available for only two major components
government services and personal (less domestic) services. The EPB
trade census of 1968 included information on personal services (less
domestic) which showed employment of 361 thousand in 141 thousand
establishments. The main employment categories included eating houses
(20 percent of the total), barber and beauty shops (another 20 percent),
and taverns (25-30 percent). Government employment (less KNR and
Ministry of Communicatlons workers) was 315 thousand at the time.
Together, these two categories accounted for approximately half of
total service-industry employment in 1968.
Published figures for government employment show the total divided
among national, local, and government-agency (such as the Office of
- 7 51National Railroads LKN! ) categories. (Government-invested enter-
prises, including KECO, the five commercial banks, major fertilizer
and coal companies, are not included) A third of listed employees
have been teachers. Though government employment has grown faster
than all-service lndustry employment (36 percent versus 25 percent from
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1963 to 1969), the government's share in total non-agricultural employment
52has remained quite low relative to that in a number of other countries
The published figures provide no evidence that government employment has
been expanded simply to soak up surplus labor.
Serv1ces and petty trade have been the traditional dumping grounds for
excess labor which could not be absorbed in agriculture. If so, one should
find below-average wage levels, and increasing numbers of traditionally
low-paid workers (women) in the trade and service occupations. In Korea,
the number of women in service industries has risen substantially faster
than the number of men (53 percent from 1963 to 1969 versus 15 percent)
This is not so in commerce. Women also receive lower wages than men in
all non-agricultural employment (about half the rate for permanent employees)
However, the big 1ncrease in women's employment came in manufacturing, not
the service sector, and the average manufacturing wage is substantially
53below the average service-industry wage. A number of possible intervening
factors such as differences in the age, education, and tenure-status
attributes of the typical service-sector and manufacturing employee may
account for these results On the other hand, the data on relative wages
and growth of female employment may indicate either that there is little
excess labor in Korea or that service-sector employment characteristics
do not always conform to traditional expectations
Employment, labor intensity, and demand for the product of the different
industry groups vary widely, even at the broad levels of aggregation used
here Still, where evidence is available, most of the groups show that
rapid output growth has been the product of lesser employment expansion,
increasing productivity and, therefore, declining labor intensity of
operations The bottlenecks caused by inadequate infrastructure which
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appeared in the 1960s are particularly significant in this respect.
Whatever their cause (unexpectedly fast growth or the government's
earl1er unwillingness to invest in highly capital-intensive projects),
the increasing share of investment allocated to infrastructure in the
last few years has worked to reduce the labor-absorpt10n rate of income
growth. 54 So have a number of the government's trade and credit
policies which, though eVidently designed to promote exports, have had
the incidental effect of discriminating against smaller and more labor
intensive activities.
Unionization is another factor which frequently has had similar
results, though union policies are desilned to raise the price of labor
rather than to reduce the cost of capital. 55 The effect of unions on
labor absorption in Korea has been minimal. There is little or no
union trad1tion in Korea. The first union, established in the late
1920s to resist the Japanese, was suppressed in the early 1930s.
Unions were active for 8 brief period before Rhee's election in 1948,
mainly as strong-arm adjuncts of opposing political parties. Since
then, unions have been 1nstru.ents of the government. Unions are not
allowed to engage in political activity, while the law preventing
interference with existing unions gives the Federation of Korean Trade
Unions (FKTU) a permanent monopoly aga1nst possible competition. It
is significant that unions were inactive in the overthrow of the Rhee
regime in 1960, and that the FKTU leaders have been replaced each time
a new government has assumed office.
Measures of the FKTU's weakness are the abysmal working conditions
and repeated violation of labor standards in Korean industry. This
became most apparent after the fiery suicide of a market worker in
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November 1970, when the Office of Labor Affairs began to release a
56
stream of reports on violations of the labor law. Another measure of
weakness is relatively low union membership. There were an estimated
367 thousand members at the end of 1967. This was only a small fraction
of the 1,370 thousand regularly employed non-farm employees who
constituted the population of potential members at the time. Until
they are freed from government patronage or a shortage of labor develops,
unions will have little effect on wages, working conditions, or labor
absorption rates in K~ea.
V. SlJMMI\RY AND CONCLUSIONS
Seasonal employment patterns, composition of the economically
inactlve populatlon, and the effects of demographic and educational
trends on numbers of potentlal labor-force entrants were examined 1n
Part II The accuracy of the employment surveys was questioned, While
the concept of "unemployment" was found to be ambiguous in an economy
like Koreals in which there are pronounced seasonal patterns in the
numbers of economlcally active and inactive.
Measures for labor lntensity. marginal productivity, and the labor
absorption rate of income growth were discussed in Part III A large
decline in the labor intensity of economic activity evidently occurred
from 1963 to 1970. The decl1ne has been due partly to a change in
economic structure, as the industrial sector expanded and the agricultural
sector shrank in relat1ve importance But it was also due to ris1ng
marginal productiVity in the different sectors as output per worker
increased The r@sult bas been that the labor absorption rate of
income growth for each mBjor sector and the economy as 8 whole (Table 5)
has been low !m~loym~nt growth ha~ been substantial, nevertheless,
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mainly because of phenomenal increases 1n manufacturing output.
Determinants of labor absorption were cons1dered 1n Part IV
Composition of output and the geographic distribution of activity under
the Japanese, the effects of partition, and subsequent planning strategy
all served to emphasize industrial expansion. This emphasis, largely
at the expense of agriculture, has widened the rural-urban income
gap and hastened the outflow of labor from the countryside.
Korean industrialization has been characterized by export promotion
rather than by import substitution. Since Korean exports have been
produced by more labor-intensive means than import substitutes, labor
absorption in the industrial sector has been greater than it might
otherwise have been. On the other hand, export-promotion policies
and, more generally, commercial policy, exchange controls, and credit
pOllcy have all tended to discriminate in favor of large (more capital
intensive) firms and machinery imports. Such discrimination, by alter1ng
relative factor prices, may have hastened the substitution of capital
for labor Union activity and minimum-wage legislation might each
achieve the same result, but there is no evidence that either has done
so 1n Korea
Examination of subsectors showed institutional developments and
shifts in output composition that have generally tended to reduce labor
absorption. In particular, this examination revealed that infrastructure
has been neglected Such neglect has required a shift in investment
toward highly capital-intensive activities during the past few years
The labor absorption rate of income growth was reduced, in consequence.
and this reduction is likely to continue during the next few years
until the infrastructure catches up with the rest of the economy.
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The discussion of actual and potential supply, output and employment,
and the determinants of labor absorption has left unanswered several
questions which, even if they cannot be answered satisfactorily, at least
deserve attention. First, to what extent is labor absorption still
a problem in Korea? That is, what are the signs of excess supply or
insufficient demand that point to adequacy or inadequacy of absorption?
Second, though not necessarily next in logical order, is a normative
issue. What constitutes satisfactory labor absorption? This question
obviously has many ramifications. Finally, the possibility of a mis-
match between the supply and demand for labor with particular occupational
skills has been ignored. Is the absorption problem partly a matter of
failure to produce workers with the particular qualifications needed
by an economy?
Price or price change is the conventional standard against which
the sufficiency or insufficiency of demand is usually judged. The
employment trend, and therefore the demand for labor in manufacturing,
is hardly typical in Korea. Nevertheless, manufacturing wage-output
relations are of interest. From 1963 to 1969, real output of manu-
factures more than tripled while employment doubled. The wage bill
(average wage times employment) increased 6.86 times but GNP originating
in manufactures (in current prices) rose only 5.74 times. The wage
increase. in short, was greater than the growth of productivity so
that unit labor costs rose 20 percent. Wage increases in other, non-
agricultural sectors have also outstripped price increases since 1967,
there lS, in addition, somewhat tenuous evidence of narrowing different-
ials between wages. 57 All this points to increasing demand (or
diminisbing surplus) in manufacturing and the other non-agricultural
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sectors Agricultural lncome. in contrast, rose only 5 percent from
1963 to 1969 while real output increased 37 percent. The wage-output
relation and drop in the supply of workers are both consistent with
declining demand (or increasing labor surplus) in agriculture.
The term "labor absorption" and the concept of a labor absorption
rate of lncome growth used here both have normative implications
Increased employment, reduction of seasonal disappearance from the
labor force, and transfer from low to high-productivity jobs are
generally conceded to be desirable. Yet there is a conflict between
increased employment and rising productlvity, just as in countries
such as the United States, the beneflts of decllning unemployment rates
tend to be offset by increasing costs of inflation There is little
agreement on the relative costs of inflation and unemployment because
judgment depends on non-economic values. The same problem arises in
evaluating the labor absorption rate of income growth since valuation
of the trade-off between employment and productiVity rests on ethical
rather than economic grounds.
Given undistorted relative factor prices, an established rate of
future discount, and smooth factor substitution, some optimal rate of
productivity increase is conceivable in which the capital intensity of
particular processes reflects true relative factor scarcities and the
actual trade-off between present and future, while production is eff1cient
in that output per unit of combined factor inputs is maximized. The
operational value of this optimal rate is of course limited by the
extent to which actual factor-price ratios, interest rates, and factor-
substitution possibilities conform to those given above. It 1s a180
limited by dynamic considerations.
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In Korea, for example, tariff structure, import licensing, credit
subsidy, and the other instruments of the export-promotion program
have distorted factor prices so as to cheapen capital relative to labor.
This has encouraged greater import of machinery and the use of more
capital-intensive production techniques, especially in export industries,
than can be justified in terms of actual factor scarcities or realistic
interest rates. This violates the short-run efficiency criter10n which
requires that inputs per unit of output be minimized. The loss involved
includes potent1al employment and output foregone due to withdrawal
of cap1tal from other uses less the actual increase in export production
(and employment) attributable to the extra capital. The 10s8 of
potential output, employment, and capacity in the domestic machinery
industry has probably been greatest. The overall residual (potential
loss less actual gain) is presumably positive
Yet if exporters had been dependent for equipment on a domestic
mach1nery industry characterized by l1mited capacity, poor product
quality, and limited access to new technology (as in Korea), the export-
promotion program would have probably died stillborn. Nor is it obvious
that factor-price distortion has been solely responsible for declining
labor intensity within particular industries. Actual opportunity for
58factor substitution in any given process may be qu\te limited. Even
where substitution 1S possible, the greater skill requirements of less
capital-intensive techniques may prove excessive. 59
But the basic argument here is that almost 40 percent of the
actual increase in employment from 1963 to 1970 came in manufacturing
despite factor-price distortion, and much of this increase was in the
export industries. This is not to deny the possibility that other
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policies might have expanded employment more but, rather, to indicate
the possible consequences of policies which have increased the exposure
of local enterprise to world markets, and thereby fostered learning
effects, adoption of new techniques, and increasing competitiveness
60that have contributed to income growth and labor absorption. None
of these factors are included in the usual short-run efficiency
crlterion. However paradoxical, capital subsidy seems to have served
to increase employment in Korea.
Aggregate measures fail to reveal the sort of suboptimal labor
utilization, or even unemployment and disappearance from the labor
force which may result from mismatch between supply and demand for
particular types of labor. The assumptlon of labor homogeneity implicit
in the use of such measures is therefore likely to yield falsely
optimistic conclusions about labor absorption. That labor is homogeneous
is as strained a construct, perhaps even more strained, than the
concept of a single capital good (spread over different uses like
"capital jelly") which is often employed in capital theory. The obviously
non-competing characteristics of many occupational categories attest
to this. Because workers differ according to skill and quality, and
labor is essentially non-homogeneous, several issues which were hitherto
ignored seem worthy of attention. For instance, how has increased
education affected labor absorptlon? Has the educational system been
able to meet the demands of a rapidly growiag economy for particular
types of skills? What evidence is there of surplus or shortage, or of
efforts to achieve equilibrium in partlcular labor markets?
ExpaDllon of upper level education more than offset the growth of
new entrants to the labor force from 1963 to 1969 (see above, page 8)
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Increase in enrollments of middle schools (72 percent) and vocational
61high schools (57 percent) were particularly marked. The average
worker, as a result of educational trends, is better educated and
62
enters the labor force at a later age. To the extent that labor
quality is reflected 1n wage differentials and the older, better
educated worker is paid more as in Korea, than the quality of labor has
increased in recent years. Quality improvement, since lt acts on output
like an increase in supply, must have raised output per worker and
reduced the labor absorption rate of income growth. But the labor
which has absorbed was in a sense "more labor" since it was more
effective. If employment measures were adjusted for increases in
quality, then, the decline in labor intensity would have been less and
the labor absorption rate of income growth would have been higher than
was shown by the measures used here.
Several studies of Korea's manpower requirements have revealed
1mbalance between expected future supply and projected demand, and
63
urged the expansion of vocational and scientific training. The
educatlonal system has apparently been unable to keep up with the
demand for certaln technical skills as the economy has expanded. Yet
there 1S eV1dence that technical or vocations1 trainlng has been wasted.
An article by Paik in 1965 showed that only a fifth of technical
high school graduates who entered colleges entered engineering colleges,
fewer than 10 percent of students enrolled in agricultural colleges
64graduated from agricultural high schools. Another scholar found that
ten years after graduation, fewer than 30 percent of college graduates
65
were working in fields related to thelr college department.
There is also widespread though uncertain evidence of a major brain
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drain and, in addition, the government has followed a policy of "exporting"
66
miners, doctors, and nurses 1n recent years.
Surplus among particular high-level manpower categories (if not
shortage among others) and the wastage of certain types of technical
training are both evidence that education has been misdirected. The
consequence has been that supply and demand for particular types of
labor are mismatched. The mismatch is due partly to excess demand for
higher education in Korea. Students undertake particular programs of
study because they are the only ones avallable to them They have no
intention of following careers which employ their training. On the
other hand, expansion of tra1ning for which there is insufficient effective
demand is also responsible. Efforts to expand vocational and technical
tra1ning 1n Korea, as elsewhere, have not been successful in applying
sayt s Law. 67 If anything, they have caused disequilibrium in particular
labor markets.
Whatever the reasons~ mismatch between supply and demand for
particular k1nds of skills has been responsible for unemployment,
emigration, or underemployment The magnitude of the problem is unknown,
but the direction of effect is evident. Information on the extent of
mismatch is clearly of intrinsic interest and would also serve to
refine and make more useful our existing measures for labor absorption.
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FOOTNOTES
P W. Kuznets
~stimates of GNP growth rates for most countries during 1960-1967 are
given in the United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics,
~, Vol. II, Table 5-B. Korea already had one of the four highest
rates in this period even though growth rates before 1962-1963 were low.
2The industrial sector is defined here, and in subsequent passages
unless otherwise indicated, to include mining, manufacturing, construction,
electric generation, water and sanitary services, transport, storage, and
communicat10ns. In 1965, over 62 percent of value added by this sector
originated in manufacturing.
3Farm lncame is net lucame (gross income less expenditures related
to farm and side-business activities) from Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry, Reports on Results of Farm Household Economy Surveys and
Production Cost Surveys of Agricultural Products. Data on urban wage
earners are from the Economic Planning Boardts Annual Reports on the
Family Income and Expenditure Surveys. Both are deflated by the
implicit deflator for private consumption expenditure, derived from the
Bank of Korea's national-accounts estimates.
4Farm and non-farm are equated with rural and urban here, which is
not strictly correct since fishermen, hunters, and others who do not
farm live 1n rural areas. On the other hand Seoul, the nation's dominant
metropol1s. had 18 thousand farmers in 1965 (Economic Planning Board,
Korea Statistical Yearbook, ~, p. 27). Nevertheless, estimates of
the farm and non-farm population probably represent the best available
substitute for census data on recent urban and rural population until
details of the 1970 population census beceme available.
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5See Economic Planning Board, Annual Report on the Economically
Active Population, 1969 (June 1970), p. 17.
6The notion of an 1nf1nitely elast1c supply of labor at a wage
somewhat above the average level of rural product originated in a
celebrated article by S1r Arthur Lewis. See W. A. Lewis, "Economic
Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, It Manchester school,
Vol. 22 (May 1954), pp. 139-91. The notion of disguised, as opposed
to open unemployment, has been applied to those who sold "matchboxes
in the Strand"during the depression of the 1930s as well 8S to peasants
or others performing low-productivity work 1n developing countries. The
literature on the unlimited-labor and disguised-unemployment hypotheses
is by now enormous. Much of this literature is c1ted in a recent
critical analysis of the structural versions of these hypotheses by
Wellisz. See Stanislaw Wellisz, "Dual Economies, Disguised Unemployment
and the Unlimited Supply of Labour," Economica, New Series, Vol. XXXV,
No.7 (February 1968), pp. 22-51.
7See Roger D. Norton, "Planning with Facts: The Case of Korea,"
American Economic Review, Vol. LX, No. 2 <May 1970), pp. 59-64. More
emphasis on manpower development than in the past is found in early
Third Plan documents. See, for instance, Larry E. Westphal, ItLabor
Projections," in Economic Planning Board, Selected Papers on the Third
Five-Year Economic Development Plan (Preparatory Stage), May 1970
(mimeographed).
8rhe practical implication here is that employment surveys should
be conducted monthly or, failing this, that seasonal employment patterns
be specified in detail by those responsible for conducting the surveys.
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The second possibility at least allows users to draw their own con-
elusions about the representativeness of the survey data.
9This is especially true when small changes in unemployment estimates
are likely to be misinterpreted. A recent article headed "Jobless Rate
Down by 0.3 Percent," for example, noted that "this represents a
decrease of 25,000 in the number of the nation's jobless persons from
471,000 in 1969 to 446,000 in 1970." The author concludes that "this
percentage figure indicates that the nation's unemployment situation has
much improved since 1969" (The Korea Times, March 23, 1971). Not only
is this change well within the standard error of estimate for labor-
force estimates in the 400-500 thousand range, Wiich means that it is
insignificant in itself, but it is also insignificant relative to the
increase in the number of the economically inactive between 1969-1970
(155 thousand).
10This figure is consistent with Ministry of Education (MOE) data
on numbers of students aged 14 years and over in 1963 and 1969, which
rose from approximately 1.0 million in 1963 to 1.5 million in 1969.
See MOE, Statistic /Sic7Yearbooks of Education.
lithe 1966 population census shows that there were 658 thousand
persons aged 14 (i.e. those born in 1952). Numbers increased for each
younger age group to 969-970 thousand 5 and 6 year olds (who will reach
14 in 1974-75) before dropping among those aged 2 to 4. See EPB, 1966
Population Census Report of Korea <May 1969). Vol. 12-1, p. 44. Inaccurate
age reporting has been a problem in previous censuses, however, mainly due
to confusion between traditional Korean and Western methods of reckoning
age. A post-enumeration survey after the 1960 census revealed net
- 42 -
undercoverage which was highest among children under 5 (4 percent).
The drop in numbers of 2-4 year olds in 1966 may therefore be partly
illusory. See Jay Soo Park, An Evaluation Study for the Accuracy of the
1960 Population and Houseing Census of Korea (A Volume in the 1960
Census Monograph Series). Seoul: Economic Planning Board, 1966.
12Gross domestic product at factor cost, which excludes both the
excess of indirect taxes over subsidies and net factor incomes from
abroad, would be preferable to GNP for comparison of income or output
with employment. Unfortunately, GDP estimates by sector for 1970
were not available as this was written. It seemed more important to
extend a short series than to substitute GDP for GNP.
13 (geometric average) growth rates for employment inAnnual compound
each sector from 1963 to 1969, with and without adjustment to a full-
time equivalent (FrE) basis, were as follows:
Agriculture Industry Services Total
Unadjusted -0.76 11.4 5.3 2.7
FTE basis -0.43 12.5 5.7 3.7
The FTE series would be preferable to the unadjusted series as measures
of labor input, but are not used in subsequent analysis because information
on average hours for 1970 was not yet available. Again, as in the
decision to use GNP rather than GDP, it seemed more important to
extend a brief series than to employ a more conceptually satisfactory
measure.
14The expression for labor intensity (n/y) and the terms for
incremental income per addittcmal worker (A yl An) which follows are
both taken from Harry T. Oshima, "Labor-Force 'Explodonll and the Labor-
intensive Sector in Asian Growth, II Economic Development and Cultural
Change, Vol. 19, No.2 (January 1971), pp. 162-63. Note, however, that
- 43 -
his 6. yl 1:1 n is defined as "incremental income (or net output) per worker, 11
while here the expression is employed to indicate incremental income (or
net output) per additional worker.
15The hypothetical increase in total employment (6 n) was derived by
multiplying 1963 labor intensity (n/y) by the increase in income (1:1 y>
for each sector, and then adding the hypothetical changes for the three
sectors. Labor intensity for total employment in 1963 (11.5) is equal
to the sum of sectoral intensititea weighted according to 1963 income
shares, and cannot be used to derive the hypothetical total since
r.n/y • r.6. y ~ I: ~/Y • 6.y) •
l6The product of nly and l:1y/tJ.n, or n/y x 6y/tJ.n = n( 6y) ;. y(6n) =
6y/y x nl 6n = 6y/y" 6 nln =R IR. The not.bton R IR has beeny n y n
used by Oshima in the article cited and elsewhere as an index
of labor absorpt10n (see also Harry T. Oshima, "Growth and Unemployment
in Singapore,ll The Malayan Economic Review, Vol. XII, No. 22 ffictober 19617,
p. 38). The inverse, Rn/Ry, is closely related to the expression Gn/Gy
used here (though Gn/Gy is employed in the form of compound annual
rates) since
R IR = 1:1 n/n. l:1y/,n y
while Gn/Gy a n + tJ.n/n" y + tJ.y/y.
17Yearly growth rates in employment and output for the manufacturing
sector in a number of Latin American countries, India, and Egypt during
the 1950s are shown by Baer and Herv" (Werner Baer and Michel E.A •
...Herve, "Emp1oyment and Industrialization in Developing Countries,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXX, No.1 LFebruary 19667, p. 91).
With the exception of the last two countr1es, G IG was on the order of
n y
one-third to one-fourth (1t was 0.7 for Egypt, 0.5 in India).
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lll.n,e value of Rn/Ry (Ry}K~CalCUlated from Table 5 is 0.47 for
services and 0.41 for industry, which shows that labor absorption assoc·
iated with 1ncome growth was somewhat higher in the former. Rounding
error that results from using annual growth rates in the derivation
reduces the sensitivity of Gn/Gy as a measure of labor absorption, and
is responsible for the identical values (0.54) for the two sectors shown
n +1 nln
in Table 5. Compare this value with the value of y +A y/y for
manufacturing in Table 6, for example.
19Suh sang Chul, "Growth and Structural Changes in the Korean
Economy S1nce 1910" (Ph.D. dissertatlon, Harvard, 1966). Table n-4.
20By 1930-36, almost half of Korean rice output was exported to
Japan. This represented over half of Japanese rice imports. Sub,
Table 111-7, and B F Johnston, Japanese Food Management in World War
!l (Stanford Stanford University Press, 1953), p. 264.
21See United Nat10ns Korean Rehabilitation Agency (UNIRA) and Food
and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Rehabilitation and Development of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in South Korea (New York Columbia
University Press, 1954), p. 12, UNKRA, An Economic Programme for Korean
Reconstruction (Washington fJJ· Robert R Nathan Associates, 1954),
p. 291 (miaeographed).
22Johnston. p. 22.
23Republic of Korea. Summary of the First Five-Year Economdc Plan
1962-1966 (Seoul no author listed, 1962). p. 24 (English version),
Government of the Republic of Korea. The Second Five-Year Economic
Development Plan' 1967-1971 (Seoul EPB. July 1966), p 33 (English
version)
24Literacy programs had reduced illiteracy to 28 percent by 1960
(EPB, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1966). while 8choo11ng was sufficiently
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widespread by 1958-61 that Korea could be ranked with semi-advanced count-
ries like Norway in terms of education. See Freder1ck Harbison and
Charles A Myers, Education, Manpower a and Economic Growth (New York
McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 102.
25The merchandise balance in 1958-62 showed an average def1cit of
almost 200 million dollars a year. Exports averaged only 33 million.
26There is a large literature which might be cited on the advantages
or disadvantages associated with import substitution as a strategy for
economic development. Among the more recent articles on the subject
that appear to be noteworthy in one respect or another is one by
Hirschman in which the change in views toward import substitution
in Latin America is summarized and the resistance toward subst1tution with
backward linkages examined. See Albert 0 H1rschman, "The Political
Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America ,II
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXXII, No.1 (February 1968), pp.
1-32. A strong case grounded on examination of effective rates of
protection has been made by Power against the sort of biases which have
resulted from the essentially naive substitution policy that has been
employed in the Philippines. See John H Power, IIImport substitution
as an Industriahzation Strategy," Phil1pp1ne Economic Journal, Vol. V,
No.2 (Second Semester 1966), pp. 167-204. More general arguments for
export promotion (of manufactures), based mainly on the value of learning
effects, competition, and borrow1ng of technology are presented by
Keesing (Donald Keesing, 1l00tward-Looking Policies and Economic
Development," Economic Journal, Vol. LXXVII. No. 306 IJune 19677, pp
- -
303-320.).
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27The average labor coefficient (number of workers per billion~
of gross output) in 1966 in adning and manufacturing was 1,457. F1gures
for some of the major import-substitute industries were chemical fert11izer,
593, petroleum products, 98; iron and steel, 324. See Bank of Korea,
Interindustry Relations Tables for 1966 (1968)
28Norton uses marginal capital coefficients from plant profile data
which show capital 1ntensity for the most up-to-date rather than for the
average establishment. See Roger D. Norton and Lee Kee JunS, "The Korean
Input-Output Planning Model," A Paper presented before the Second Far
Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society (Tokyo United States
Operations Mission to Korea, 1967), p. 25. These coefficients are also
given 1n Irma Adelman, David C Cole, Roger Norton, and T~ee Kee Jung, lithe
Korean Sectoral Model," 1n Irma Adelman, ed., Practical Approaches to
Development Planning Korea's Second F1ve-Year Plan (Baltimore The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 120. Export/import ratios and the argument
that Korea's trade is increasingly oriented toward less capital-intensive
products csn be found in Roger D. Norton, "The South Korean Economy in
the 1960' s," Paper presented before the Annual Meeting of the Association
for Asian Studies (Washington International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, March 1971).
29prank notes the tendency for labor supply and demand to interact
so that increasing employment is accompanied by increasing unemployment.
The number of entrants to the urban labor force is not only a function
of rural-urban income differentials, but also of the (subjective)
probability of getting an urban job which depends, in turn, on the ratlo
of unemployed to employed. See C R Frank, Jr., "Urban Unemployment and
Economic Growth in Africa, It Oxford Economic Papers (N S ), Vol. 20. No.
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2 (July 1968), pp. 266-68.
30See Philip M. Raup, uLand Reform and Agricultural Development,"
in Herman M Southworth and Bruce F. Johnston, eds, Agricultural Develop·
ment and Economic Growth (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1967),
pp. 285-92.
31projections are from the National Association of Cooperative
Federations (NACF), Rural Credit Survey,~ (1965), pp. 11, 221.
nata on farmers' saving can be found in the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry's Reports on the Results of Farm Household Economr Surveys.
32Korea had fewer than two thousand garden tractors in the udd-1960s
when Japan had 2.5 million (see PAO, Production Yearbook. 1967). The
reason is not small farm size (i.e. below the minimum efficient size that
would support a tractor) The doctrine that farms, to be efficient,
must be large enough to support tractors has been questioned by Schultz,
who argues that it is incorrect because it is concerned with pseudo-
indivisibi1ities rather than real ones. See Theodore W. Schultz,
Transforming Traditional Agriculture (New Haven· Yale University, 1964),
pp. 122-24. Instead, mechanization in Korea has been limited because
emphasis bas been placed on raising output per unit of land rather than on
increasing output per worker.
33FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture. 1968, p. 18
34Korea is not unique in this respect. A study by Ishikawa of the
contribution of additional labor input to agricultural output in a number
of Asian countries also shows a positive relation between levels of out-
put and levels of labor inputs, and a negative one between labor input and
holding size. See Shlgeru Ishikawa, Economic Development in A8ian
Perspective (Economic Research Series Number 8, The Institute of
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Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University). Tokyo· Kinokuniya,
1967, pp. 218, 230-31.
35B S Minhas, An International Comparison of Factor Costs and Factor
!!! (Amlterdam North-Bolland, 1963), pp. 24-42.
36M June Flanders, "Agriculture versus Industry in Development
Policy The Planner's Dilemma Re-examined," Journal of Development
Studies, Vol. 5, ft).3 (April 1969), p. 184.
37Ministry of Finance, Foreign Trade of Korea, 1966, p. 296.
38Korean Development Association, Effective Protective Rates of
Korean Industries (Seoul: Korean Development Association, 1967), Table
IV (English version).
39Discriadnation against smaller firms in the allocation of credit
is not new In 1963, for example, small-scale enterprises (defined as
those having lesl than 30 million~ in assets and, in manufacturing,
less than 200 employees) accounted for approximately 60 percent of
manufacturing output but received less than 40 percent of outstanding
loans from all banking institutions ("banking institutions" do not
include the KDB, then the Korean Reconstruction Bank). See MIB, ~
Introduction to small Industries in Korea (1966), pp. 14, 77. If
KRB loans and discounts are included in the total for manufacturing, the
share of smaller firms falls to 27 percent, or les8 than half of their
output share. More recently, a number of small firms have closed for
lack of funds, and the government has promised to expand credit for
small and medium enterprise (see The Korea Times, January 29, 1971)
40Ron-electric machinery includes a much higher proportion of
investment goods <as opposed to consumer goods) tban electric macbinery
or transport equipment, tbe two otber conventional investment-goods
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categories. The production index for all manufacturing shows that output
almost quadrupled between 1963 and 1970. Production of non-electrlc
machinery rose less than 40 percent.
41The capital coefficient (k/Y) figures for South Korea rt ••• ' jump'
a great deal, ffiu'!:,.7 on the whole the tendency is for the capital
coefficient to be inversely related to size••• n (Harry T OshiM,
"tabor-Force 'Explosion' and the Labor-intensive Sector in Asian Growth,"
p. 166)
420ne other noteworthy difference, from the analyst's vIewpoint, 1S
that lnformatlon on establishment size, assets, output mix, wages, and
the other factors that might be expected to influence labor absorption
1S either unavailable for these industries or has been collected only
durlng the past few years The first trade census was taken in 1968,
for instance, and the first survey of service-sector wages in 1969
43Roger D Norton and Lee Kee Jung, liThe Korean Input-Output Planning
Mode 1," pp 45-49
44see Table 6 I have seen no data on numbers of Korean workers
in Vletaam, but balance-of-payments receipts for " other services"
(which Include remittances of such workers) almost tripled from 1966
to 1969 before levelling off in 1969
45Construction wages in 1970 were 1.5 times the all-industry average
(Korean Industrial Development Center, Report on Wage Survey, 1970
LVol 1:.7, P 99) The seoul Consumer Price Index for 1969 (1965 - 100)
was 172 0 The index for housemending wages (266 3) was the highest for
any component of the Seoul CPI
46The small numbers (25 thousand) make publlc-utility employment
particularly liable to estimating error On the other hand, because
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survey respondents are el.tberpemment agencies or a large, government-
invested firm, report1ng is likely to be particularly accurate Also,
the decline after 1963 is consistent with the sharp drop in government
expenditure (relat1ve to GNP) which occurred 1n 1963-64 as fiscal
deficits were eliminated
47Regressions of percentage change in output on percentage change in
employment for the East African Railways and N1gerian Railways also
show rap~d increase 1n ton-mile productivity from 1948 or 1949 to 1963
See C R Frank, Jr » "Urban Unemployment and Economic Growth in Africa,"
pp 260-61
48Ministry of Transportation, Korea Transportation Survey Draft
Report (1966), Vol I, p. 10
49EPB, Wholesale and Retail Trade Census Report, 1968 (1969).
SOThe Korea Times, February 13, 1971
51The figures for government employment are given in the EPa. Korea
Statistical Yearbook, 1970
52Government employment (excluding that in government-1nvested
enterprises), was less than 10 percent of non-agricultural employment 1n
1969 Th~s statistic varied between 38 and 52 percent 1n Uganda, Kenya,
Tanzania, N1geria, and Ghana in the early 1960s See C R Frank, Jr •
"Urban Unemployment and Economic Growth in Africa," p 255.
53
nata on wages by sector and male-female wage differentials are
g~ven ~n the Korean InduBtrial Development Center's Report on Wage
Survey, 1970, Vol I
54The share of electricity, water, and sanitary services in gross
domestiC fixed capital formation more than doubled from 1966 to 1968-1969;
outlays for transport and communications rose from a low of 17 per-
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cent in 1964 to almost 28 percent in 1969.
55Government minimu~age legislation can have the same effect as
union action in raising the price of labor For example, m1nimum-wage
laws in Puerto RlCO (where unions are weak as in Korea) have been tied
to the wage provisions of the U S Fair Labor Standards Act in manufact-
ur1ng plants sponsored by the Commonwealth's Economic Development
Administration The result has been a tripling of median wage minima
from 1949 to 1963 and (given simplifying assumptions about the nature of
production functions and labor intensity) a price elasticity of employment
of approximately - 1 0 That is, changes in wages and employment are
equiproportional in the opposite direction. Manufacturlng employment
rose 36 thousand from 1950 to 1962 Potential manufacturing employment
lost through wage increase, given the estimated value for wage elasticity
of employment, was calculated to have been nine thousand job. from 1949 to
1954, and another 29 thousand from 1954 to 1958 See L G Reynolds,
"Wages and Employment in a Labor-Surplus Economy," Amerl.can Economic
Review, Vol LV, No 1 (March 1965), pp 22-34. Adverse effects of
such a minimum-wage policy on employment appear to be substantial
There is no minimum-wage legislation 1n Korea
56
"More than 98 percent of the nation's major enterprises are v10lating
the labor standard law the most frequent violation was unhealthy
workl.ng conditions" according to the Office of Labor Affairs (The Korea
T1mes, January 22, 1971) Perhaps the most that can be said for
Korean enterprlse is that the current labor law (enacted in 1953), which
was based on the most enhghtenecf Western models, is so poorly adapted to
Korean conditions that employers who obeyed the law would probably
be bankrupted
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57Korea Industrial Development Center, Vol. I, pp. 136, 145.
58There is little quant1tative evidence on the degree to which labor
and capital may be substituted for each other. A recent study by
Clague provides estimates of the elasticity of substitution between
labor and capital for 11 manufacturing 1ndustries in the United States
and Peru. His elasticity estimates are very low. See Christopher K
Clague, "Capital-Labor Substitut10n in Manufacturing in Underdeveloped
Countries," Econometrica, Vol. 37, No.3 (July 1969), pp. 528-37.
59It has been argued that skilled labor must be distinguished from
unskilled labor because the supply of skilled workers rather than capital
may prove to be the scarce factor in labor surplus economies. If so,
then the apparent anomaly of capital-intensive production coexisting
with traditional, labor-1utensive activities may result from substitution
of capital for the scarce factor, skilled labor. ",See Baer and Herve,
pp. 97-102.
60Tbese are the main points raised by Keesing in arguing the merits
of an outward-looking (as opposed to an inward-looking) development
strategy. See footnote 26.
61Service in the armed forces (500-600 thousand men) has also
acted to raise labor quality and reduce the supply of new labor-force
entrants, though constancy of troop levels has d1minished the relative
importance of military training as population has grown.
62One consequence is that the proportion of the economically
active population less than 30 years of age fell from 39.5 percent
in 1963 to 35.3 percent in 1969 (EPB, Annual Report on the Economically
Active population, 1969, Table 5).
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63
Republic of Korea, 'Ihe Second F~ve-Year Plan for Science and
Technology· 1967-71 (1966) provides estimates Which show that the supply
of scientists. engineers. and other professionals was a third larger
than needed in 1967, but that the supply of new technicians would
satisfy only 55 percent of the expected increase in demand during the
Second Plan period. A Unesco advisory team held that "expansion of
technical high schools and science and engineering faculties •• is
imperative ••" (United Nations Educat1ona1, Scientific, and Cultural
Organizat1on, Long-term Projections for Education 1n the Republic of
Korea !Bangkok Unesco Regional Office for Education in Asia, 19617.
p 14). President Park a180 emphasized the need for science education
and vocational training in a recent speech before a teachers' group
(The Korea T~mes. January 23, 1971)
64
Paik Ryun-ki, "Educational Plans and Economic Plans," Journal of
Science and Humanities (Seoul Bulletin of the Korea Research Center),
Vol. XXIII (December 1965), pp. 37-41.
65Horace Underwood. "Korean Education Master of the Future or
Slave of the Past," Roreana Quarterly, Vol. V. No. 3 (Autumn 1963).
pp. 52-57.
66The need for more information on internat~onal migration of high"
level manpower 18 discussed in E.M Godfrey, "The Brain Drain from Low-
Income Countries," Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (April
1970). pp 235-38. A recent report of the Health-Social Affairs Ministry
indicated that over four thousand medical technicians (doctors, dentists,
and nurses) were practicing abroad (The Korea T1mes, January 24, 1971)
whi Ie a subsequent agreement to send 13 thousand nurses and nurses
aides to West Germany by 1974 touched off a controversy on the opportunity
- 54 -
cost to Korea of the government's sponsoring such migration (see
The Korea T1mes, February 28, 1971)
67The problem of misplaced emphasis on vocational training in the
manpower programs of developing countries is discussed by Foster. See
Philip J Foster, liThe Vocational-School Fallacy in Development Planning,"
in C Arnold Anderson and Mary Jean Bowman, eds. t Education and EcoDOSdc
Development (Chicago Aldine, 1963), pp. 142-162.
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Table 1 - Activity Statu. of!h!. Worktus-Ased Population: 1963-1970
thousands
1970
1969
1963
Population
tIed 14 & !lP
17,907
Economically
Active
10,020
',612
Economically
Inactive
7,887
7,032
Employment:
Unadjusted
9,574
9,347
7,947
9,403
7,512
Change:
1963-70 2,223
Chatlge:
1963-69
% increase
1963-70 14
% increase
1963-69
1,368
--
16
855
12
1,627
1,400
20
--
1,851
25
~I Full-time equivalent (PTE) adjusted to an average work week of 50
hours.
Sources: EPB, Annual Reports on The Economicallv Active Population; BOK,
Monthly Economtcs Statistics, March 1971.
..
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Table 3 - Sectoral Distribution 2! Output~ Employment: 1963-1970
1. Output (Gross National Product at 1965 constant market prices)
billion won
!!!!. Asricu1ture!-I Industry:!~/ servicess.,1 Total
1963 270.56 174.15 247.72 693.03
1964 314.31 187.59 248.41 750.31
1965 311.63 227.58 266.64 805.85
1966 345.91 266.18 301.73 913.82
1967 326.90 322.00 346.26 995.16
1968 330.84 409.63 385.85 1,127.32
1969 370.36 505.36 430.47 1,306.19
1970 p 377.67 580.50 475.30 1,433.47
2. Employment thousands
X!.!!. Agricu1turedl Industry dl Services I TotalFTpj:./Unad1. ~ Unadl. ~ Unadl. FT#. Unad1.
1963 5,021 4,310 1,032 1,094 1.894 2.148 7,947 7,552
1964 5.084 4,251 1.094 1,193 2,032 2,288 8.210 7.732
1965 4,999 4.136 1,349 1,523 2,174 2.491 8.522 8.150
1966 5,013 4.087 1,356 1,547 2,290 2,625 8,6S9 8,259
1967 4.924 4,078 1,622 1,781 2.368 2.745 8.914 8,604
1968 4,863 3.984 1.869 2.157 2.529 2,989 9,261 9,130
1969 4,798 4,194 1.968 2.215 2,582 2,994 9,347 9,403
1970 4,834 2,016 2.724 9,574
a/ Agriculture, forestry, and fishery.lit Mining; manufacturing; construction; electricity. water, and sanitary
services; transport. storage, and communications.
cl All other.
~I Full-time equivalent (actual ~nadjuste~7 employment adjusted to a SO
hour work week on basis of average hours worked in each of 9 subsectors).
Sources· BOK, Monthly Economic Statistics, March 1971, EPB, Korea statistical
Yearbook. ill.Q.; EPB. Annual Reports .2!!. S!!!. Economically Active
Population.
..
Table 4 - Average Work-Week .2z Subsector 1963-1969
Average Hours per Week
Sector ~ 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
- Ag., forestry 42.5 41.5 41.0 40.4 41.1 39.6 43.3
- Hunting, Fishery 52.9 50.4 49.5 50.3 48.1 69.7 57.2
- M.1.ning, quarry1.ng 52.3 52.0 55.2 53.8 54.9 54 0 53.6
- Manufacturing 54.3 55.1 57.0 57.4 53.8 57.6 56.3
- Construction 46.5 48.9 49.6 51.8 53.5 54.6 53.3
- Pubhc Utilitus 51.4 47.0 53.4 53.1 50.1 54.2 47.5
- C01IIIlerce 60.9 59.2 59.7 60.1 60.3 60.4 59.1 VI
- Transport, Storage, '"
Communication 57.7 60.6 63.4 63 8 63.9 64.6 61.5
- Services 53.8 54.1 55.3 55.2 55.9 57.9 57.1
TOTAL 47.5 47.1 48.2 47.7 48.3 49.3 50.3
Sources· Economic Planning Board, Annual Report on the Economically Active population, 1969, Economic
Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1970.
Note- Rev1.sion of average-hour estimates can be seen in the Yearbook, but are not given in the Annual
Reports. Whereever there was a difference, the Yearbook fl.gure was used.
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Table 5 - Labor Intensitx, Marginal Productivity, and
Growth Rates' Ma'or Sectors
Agr1cu1ture Industry (Manufact. ) Services Total
Employment (n)!.1 thousands
1970 4,830 2,026 (1,260) 2,717 9,573
1963 5,021 1,032 ( 631) 1,894 7,947
change (6n) (Gn>!!/ -191 +994 ( +629) +823 +1,626growth rate -0.55 10.1 ( 10.4) 5.3 2.7
Income (x)!.1 billion won
1970 377 .67 580.50 (378.14) 475.30 1,433.47
1963 270.56 174.75 (111.63) 247.72 693.03
change (6y)
(Gy)!!,1
107.11 405.75 (266.51) 227.58 740.44
growth rate 4.9 18.7 ( 19.0 ) 9.8 10.9
labor intensitx£' 18.6 5.9 ( 5.7 ) 7.6 11.5
(n/y)
Margul8l
Productivity -0.56 0.41 ( 0.42) 0.28 0.46
(6y/ fn)
Hypothetical increase!!'
in employment (6n) 1,988 2,396 1,740 6,124
GnlGy
-0.11 .54 ( .55) 54 .25
al Employment (UlJ8dju8ted) and income from Table 3.
hI Compound annual (geometric average) rates
~I Man years per million won of income (output) in 1963
~I Change in income (by) ilies labor-intensity in 1963 (n/y).
Sources same as in Table 3.
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Table 6 - Labor Intensity. Marginal Productivity, and
Growth Rates Wlthin the Industr1a1 and Service SectoIB
Industry Services
Mining, Transp. ,
Quar- Pub. Stor. ,
ryins Mftrs. Const. Util. COIIIIIun. Commerce Servo
Employ. (n) Thousands
1970 109 1,260 279 Z5 343 1,190 1,534
1963 59 631 200 II 117 785 1,109fl n 50 629 79 0 ill 405 425
Inc. (y)
1970 19.24 378.14 75.61 30.47 77.04 316.90 143.33
1963 11.86 111.63 20.69 7.10 23.47 151.06 89.87
AY 7 38 266.51 54.92 23 37 53.57 165.84 43.46
Labor intensity
(n/y) 5 0 5.7 9.7 3.5 5.0 5 2 12.3
Marg. Prod.
<A y/~n) 0.15 0.42 0.70 CD 0.24 0.41 0.10
n+l1m/n 185.75 199.68 139.50 100.0 293.16 151.59 138.32
Y+Al'l 162.23 338.74 365.44 429.16 323.99 209.78 159.49
n+M.~~/ 1.14 0.59 0.38 0.23 0.90 0.72 0.87
y+§o y
!./ This last expression is equivalent to Gn/Gy in Table 5 (see
footnote 16), except that it is expressed in index rather
than annual (geometric) growth-rate form.
Sources As in Table 3.
Table 7 - Distribution .2! Employment!!!!! Value Added kt. Establishment~ !!!. Manufacturipg
Establishment~ (Number ~ Workers)
Total 1:1 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 200-499 500+
Number of Workers -
1959 261,327 44,964 40,969 54,871 33,880 28,555 27,002 31,086
- ~ 100.0 17.2 15.7 21.0 13.0 10.9 10.3 11.9
1963 401,981 60,564 56,038 64,758 46,811 38,651 45,767 89,392
- ~ 100.0 15.1 13.9 16.1 11.7 9.6 11.4 22.2
1968 748,307 85,689 79,305 95,633 70,673 73,606 109,525 233,876
- ~ 100.0 11.5 10.6 12.8 9.4 9.8 14.6 31.3
Value Added
(mllion won) a-
N
1958-59 15,755 1,906 2,171 2,800 1,945 1,725 2,730 2,478
~ 100.0 12.1 13.8 17 .8 12.3 10.9 17.3 15.7
1963 61,534 5,986 5,881 7,511 6,710 6,430 8,826 20,189
- "1 100.0 9.7 9.6 12.2 10.9 10.5 14.3 32.8
~ 301,445 16,783 19,691 24,944 22,344 23,943 54,701 139,040
% 100.0 5.6 6.5 8.3 7.4 7.9 18.2 46.1
Sources Korean Reconstruction Bank, FU\81 Report-Census of Ml.ning and Manufacturina. 1958, Economic
Planning Board-Korea Development Bank, Report on Mhung and Manufacturing Census, 1968;
Economic Planning Board - Korean Reconstruchon Bank, Report on MJ.ning and Manufactur1ng
Census, 1963.
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Table 8 - Capital Intensity 21 Istab1ishment Size'
M1ning~ Manufacturing, !!§!*
million~
Est. Value No. of Fixed Wage Production
.§!.!! Added Workers Assets Bill Costs
-
5-9 13,980 82,183 23,722 4,975 18,881
10-19 17,150 79,141 28,601 6,315 26,210
20-49 24,642 100,586 38,367 8,317 38,298
50-99 22,397 73,467 28,695 6,791 36,205
100-19r#.' 22,662 76,485 28,406 7,660 37,196
200-499 52,792 120,875 68,512 14,152 76,874
500+ 125,683 258,446 188,421 33,513 204,455
Est.
V.A ./Asset,).1 cl
Wage Bill Wale B11l
~ V.A. /Worker- Prod. Costs (;) (V.A (b)
5-9 0.59 170 26.3 35.6
10-19 0.60 217 24.1 36.8
20-49 0.64 245 21.7 33.8
50-99 0.78 305 18.9 30.3
100-199 0.80 296 20.6 33.8
200-499 0.77 437 18.4 26.8
500+ 0.67 486 16.4 26.7
~. The beverage and tobacco industries are excluded because a large
portion of value added is composed of excise taxes in these industries.
!/ Cement manufactures are excluded from this size group. The Census
shows 16.7 billion in assets, but no shipments or value added for the
group.
hI Value added (in won) per w_on of tangible fixed assets.£1 Thousand~ per worker.
Source EPB-KDB, Report on Mining and Manufactur1DS Census! 1968.
